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A longstanding debate in the philosophy of action opposes causalists to anti- 
causalists. Causalists claim the authority of Davidson, who offered powerful ar-
guments to the effect that intentional explanations must be causal explanations. 
Anti- causalists claim the authority of Wittgenstein, who offered equally powerful 
arguments to the effect that reasons cannot be causes. My aim in this paper is to 
achieve a rapprochement between Davidsonian causalists and Wittgensteinian anti- 
causalists by showing how both sides can agree that reasons are not causes, but that 
intentional explanations are causal explanations. To this end, I first defuse David-
son’s Challenge, an argument purporting to show that intentional explanations are 
best made sense of as being explanatory because reasons are causes. I argue that 
Wittgenstein furnishes anti- causalists with the means to resist this conclusion. I then 
argue that this leaves the Master Argument for the claim that intentional explanations 
are causal explanations, but that by distinguishing between a narrow and a wide 
conception of causal explanation, we can resolve the stalemate between Wittgen-
steinian anti- causalists impressed by the thought that reasons cannot be causes and 
Davidsonian causalists impressed by the thought that intentional explanations must 
be causal explanations.
1. Davidson’s Challenge
Causalists and anti- causalists in the philosophy of action have been opposing 
each other for decades.1 One side has claimed the authority of Donald Davidson, 
who offered powerful arguments to the effect that intentional explanations must 
1. See Alvarez (2007), Sandis (2009), Candlish and Damnjanovic (2013), and D’Oro and Sandis 
(2013) for overviews of the debate.
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be causal explanations— a view that has achieved the status of “a central dogma 
in many circles within philosophy of mind” (Sehon 2016: 4).2 The other side has 
claimed the authority of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who offered equally powerful 
arguments to the effect that reasons cannot be causes, because reasons are subject 
to first- person authority in a way in which causes are not; reasons are normally 
neither physiological processes nor (onsets of) mental states, but what our men-
tal states are about, which makes them unlikely candidates as causes of action; 
and reasons justify where causes could not.3
My aim in this paper is to achieve a rapprochement between Davidsonian 
causalists and Wittgensteinian anti- causalists by showing how both sides can 
agree that reasons are not causes, but that intentional explanations are causal 
explanations. To this end, I begin by defusing what I call Davidson’s Challenge, 
an argument purporting to show that intentional explanations are best made 
sense of as being explanatory because reasons can be causes.4 I argue that Witt-
genstein furnishes anti- causalists with the means to resist this conclusion (Sec-
tion 2). I then argue that this leaves what I call the Master Argument for the claim 
that intentional explanations are causal explanations, but that by distinguishing 
between a narrow and a wide conception of causal explanation, we can resolve 
the stalemate between Wittgensteinian anti- causalists who are impressed by the 
thought that reasons cannot be causes and Davidsonian causalists who are im-
pressed by the thought that intentional explanations must be causal explana-
tions (Section 3).
Chief among the arguments which Davidson advanced in “Actions, Reasons, 
and Causes” (2001a), the essay which shattered a longstanding Wittgenstein- 
inspired consensus on anti- causalism, is an inference to the best explanation: 
when we ask why someone acted as they did, we do not just want to know a rea-
son to perform the action, but we want to know which reason they actually acted 
on; and the best account of the difference between these two kinds of reasons is 
that the latter was causally efficacious in bringing about the action. Davidson thus 
throws down the gauntlet against anti- causalist accounts of action explanation 
by challenging them to differentiate between the following two cases:
(1) A has a reason to φ and φ- s for precisely that reason.
(2) A has a reason to φ and φ- s, but does not φ for that reason.
2. See Mele (1992; 2003), Bishop (1989), and the essays in Aguilar and Buckareff (2010) for nu-
anced versions of causalist views.
3. Queloz (2017); see also Schroeder (2001), Hacker (2009), and Glock (2014).
4. I thereby pursue the line of thought which Glock (2014: 42– 43), at the end of a comparative 
study of Wittgenstein and Davidson on reasons for action, identifies as requiring further investiga-
tion. Tripodi (2015) pursues a similarly reconciliatory strategy from the other direction, as it were, 
by arguing that Davidson’s conception of intentional explanation is misleadingly described as a 
causalist one.
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If reasons are to explain actions, it will not suffice to observe that A φ- d and had 
a reason to φ:
. . . for a person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, 
yet this reason not be the reason why he did it. Central to the relation 
between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent per-
formed the action because he had the reason. (Davidson 2001a: 9)
What could enable us to differentiate between (1) and (2), Davidson asks, if not 
the fact that the reason in question was causally efficacious in bringing about 
A’s φ- ing? He concludes that “failing a satisfactory alternative, the best argu-
ment for a [causal] scheme . . . is that it alone promises to give an account of the 
‘mysterious connection’ between reasons and actions” (Davidson 2001a: 11). 
This is Davidson’s Challenge. It purports to show that intentional explanations 
are causal explanations because the reasons for which we act are the causes of 
our actions.
However, Davidson’s later writings suggest that his position is perhaps 
not as far removed from the Wittgensteinian view of intentional explana-
tion as these historical dialects suggest. Davidson leaves ample room for 
the idea that intentional explanations are of a markedly different kind from 
those given in the natural sciences. In “Mental Events” (Davidson 2001d), he 
makes it clear that no conceptual reduction of intentional to physical expla-
nation is to be had.5 Elsewhere, he insists that “there is an irreducible differ-
ence between psychological explanations that involve the propositional at-
titudes and explanation in sciences like physics and physiology” (Davidson 
2004: 101), and that “the methodology of history (or, for that matter, of any 
of the social sciences that treat individual human behaviour) differs mark-
edly from the methodology of the natural sciences” (Davidson 2005: 285). 
Davidson’s granting that “beliefs and intentions are not little entities lodged 
in the brain” (1999: 654) also indicates his agreement with Wittgenstein in 
rejecting the hypostatisation of reasons for action as parts of “a hidden ma-
chine, say, a machine in [the] brain” (Waismann 1965: 122). Wittgenstein’s 
anti- causalism forms part of his crusade against what he regards as a mis-
guided tendency to hypostatise psychological phenomena, and while he is 
adamant that reasons are not causes, he has little to say on whether inten-
tional explanations are a species of causal explanation; and one can deny 
that reasons are causes, in the strict sense of figuring as relata in causal rela-
5. This reflects Davidson’s belief in the anomalism of the mental: while causal relations are 
nomological in character, i. e., fall under strict laws, there are no strict laws relating mental and the 
physical events. In “Mental Events,” he aims to show how this is compatible with the idea that at 
least some mental events interact with physical events.
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tions, while endorsing the weaker claim that intentional explanations are a 
species of causal explanation.6
This indicates that a rapprochement between Wittgensteinian anti- causalism 
about reasons and Davidsonian causalism about intentional explanation may 
be in the offing. And indeed, I shall argue that by distinguishing a narrow from 
a wide conception of causal explanation, we can maintain that the reasons for 
which we act are not causes, but that intentional explanations are causal expla-
nations in virtue of citing features of persons associated with events standing 
in causal relations to actions. But paving the way for such a rapprochement re-
quires defusing Davidson’s Challenge, since that argument purports to tie the 
intelligibility of intentional explanation to the causal efficacy of the reasons for 
which we act. It is therefore to the task of defusing Davidson’s Challenge using 
Wittgenstein’s anti- causalism that we first turn.
2. A Wittgensteinian Response to Davidson’s Challenge
Davidson’s Challenge to differentiate between a reason to φ and the reason one 
φ- ed is really two challenges: an epistemic challenge to tell the difference between 
a reason and the reason, and a metaphysical challenge to answer the constitutive 
question of what makes a reason the reason for which one acted.7 In this section, 
I argue that Davidson’s Challenge fails to settle the argument between the cau-
salist and the anti- causalist, and thus fails to tie the intelligibility of intentional 
explanation to the causal efficacy of the reasons for which we act, because (a) 
Wittgenstein provides anti- causalists with the means to resist the challenge, and 
(b) causalists themselves struggle to spell out how reasons must cause actions if 
the agent is to act for that reason without presupposing the notion of acting for 
reasons.
A Wittgensteinian response to Davidson’s Challenge might start by noting, 
first, that explanations in terms of reasons serve to interpret some bodily move-
ment as constituting a particular kind of action. The paradigmatic situation in 
which such explanations have a point and are called for is when a deed becomes 
a riddle to us (Wittgenstein 2009: §79). To be given an explanation in terms of rea-
sons is to be given the “trains of thought” that lead to an action, which enables 
one to understand the action (Wittgenstein 1982: §§92– 94). An intentional expla-
nation thus serves an interpretive function. It “gives the attitudinal conditions in 
6. As Alvarez (2007: 105) and Glock (2014) have noted.
7. One may doubt whether this distinction is available to interpretationists like Davidson 
who take the best guide to the ontology or nature of the mental to be the epistemology of the mental. 
Yet even on an interpretationist account of the mental, we can still distinguish between how we 
know someone is in a mental state and what it is to be in that state.
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terms of which to derive the understanding of the agent’s behaviour as the act 
that he performed” (Stoutland 1976: 302). Providing an explanation for an ac-
tion, and even denying an explanation for an action— “I’m leaving the room, but 
not because you tell me to” (Wittgenstein 2009: §487)— elucidates the action’s 
meaning in light of the circumstances of the action and of how it fits within the 
wider pattern of the agent’s behaviour.
Second, for Wittgenstein, identifying the reason on which someone acted is a 
matter of the “circumstantial evidence” (2009: §488), of the context in which the 
action occurs and of how well a given reason helps us make sense of the overall 
pattern of the agent’s verbal and non- verbal behaviour. This circumstantial evi-
dence includes:
•  what the agent said or did at the time;
•  what she said or did earlier or later, particularly when asked for reasons;
•  what reasons previously weighed with her in comparable circumstances;
•  what we take to be in or out of character for her;
•  what she would have said and done had she been asked what her reasons 
were;
•  her abilities (such as her ability to speak a language).
Just as context is crucial to ascribing reasons to persons in general, it is crucial 
to determining the reason on which someone actually acted. Wittgenstein illus-
trates this in one of his lectures by imagining himself and one of his students, 
James Taylor, walking along a river, when suddenly, Taylor stretches out his 
arm and pushes Wittgenstein into the water. Puzzled, Wittgenstein asks Taylor 
“why he did this” (1966: 22), and two explanations for Taylor’s action are pro-
posed: “(1) He subconsciously hated the other man”, and “(2) He was pointing 
at something” (1966: 23). To decide between the two explanations, Wittgenstein 
goes on to argue, we look to the context of the action, that is, to what Taylor 
himself said was the reason that weighed with him in his deliberation, to how 
truthful Taylor was known to be about such things, to Taylor’s past behaviour, to 
the circumstances of the action, and to Taylor’s character; we would declare the 
second explanation to be correct if “he had never shown any unfriendly feelings, 
[if] a church- steeple and I were in his field of vision, and Taylor was known to 
be truthful” (1966: 23).8 Interpretation is required to get us from mere motion to 
meaningful movement, and even when we have one description of such a move-
ment (“he stretched out his arm”), that interpretation may not suffice to make 
8. Wittgenstein also remarks that it is in view of the larger context that an explanation in 
terms of unconscious reasons would be corroborated: namely if it “often happened” that when 
one person “was obviously pointing out something and pushed the other in the river,” “the person 
pushed in had a similarity with the father of the other person” (1966: 22– 23).
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sense of the action in the wider context. This is where we ask for explanation, 
and an intentional explanation provides a redescription of the action by present-
ing it as the expression of particular purposes and intentions. The function of 
intentional explanation, on this account, is to interpret deeds, and the correct in-
tentional explanation is that which best makes sense of the overall patterns of the 
agent’s behaviour and utterances.
Within these patterns, a special role is played on Wittgenstein’s view by what 
the agent says his or her reasons were. Normally, the agent “cannot be mistaken 
in specifying his reason . . . we call the reason that which he gives as his reason” 
(Wittgenstein & Waismann 2003: 110):
“Why are you turning out the light in your room?” I say: “Because I want 
to go to sleep.” He asks: “Are you sure?” And I reply: “I must surely 
know why I am doing it.” This certainty indicates that specifying a rea-
son is the criterion for having this reason. (Wittgenstein & Waismann 
2003: 31)
The certainty in question does not reflect one’s privileged epistemic access to 
one’s practical deliberation, but rather one’s (defeasible) first- personal authority 
in stating what one’s reason is. As Wittgenstein puts it in the Blue Book, “In order 
to know the reason which you had for making a certain statement, for acting in 
a particular way, etc., no number of agreeing experiences is necessary” (1958: 
15). In giving one’s reason, one makes an expressive rather than a descriptive 
move in the language game: one does not report a connection between a reason 
and the action it is a reason for, or “read it off from some other process which 
took place then” (Wittgenstein 2009: §637), “on grounds of self- observation,” but 
rather voices one’s mind and thereby tells others something about oneself “which 
goes beyond what happened at that time” (2009: §659), namely how the action 
fits within the larger pattern of one’s thought and behaviour. In this sense, one 
does not describe, but makes a connection between what one did and why one 
did it (Wittgenstein 2009: §486, §§682– 683).9
Of course, one may have reasons for what one did and still be silent as to 
what these reasons were, or make disingenuous, insincere, or self- deceived 
statements about what they were. But what then makes it true that one still had 
a reason for acting as one did, or that one is insincere, disingenuous, or self- 
deceived in specifying one’s reason, is the wider context of one’s verbal and 
non- verbal behaviour.10 These cases are derivative on the basic case in which the 
9. For a more extensive discussion of Wittgenstein’s views on agents’ first- personal authority 
in giving reasons, see Queloz (2017).
10. It is true that on this kind of patternalist account, there would be a point at which, if the 
agent were shifty and changeable enough— in the way that the eponymous character in Diderot’s 
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reason is “nothing more than just the one [the agent] gives when asked” (Witt-
genstein 1979: 5).
This furnishes the anti- causalist with ample means to resists Davidson’s 
Challenge in both its epistemic and its metaphysical key.11 Taking up the termi-
nology proposed by Glock (2014: 43), we can distinguish two different strands in 
this Wittgensteinian response to Davidson’s Challenge:
Deliberationism: what distinguishes the reason on which someone acted 
from other reasons to act this way is that it is the reason that weighed the 
most in the agent’s deliberation.
Patternalism: what distinguishes the reason on which someone acted from 
other reasons to act this way is that it is the reason that best makes sense 
of the overall pattern of the agent’s verbal and non- verbal behaviour.
On a Wittgensteinian view, these two strategies are of course linked, for one 
way of spelling out the deliberationist strategy is in terms of patternalism: which 
reasons weighed the most in the agent’s deliberation is normally, though not 
necessarily or indefeasibly, determined by the agent’s truthful declarations or 
avowals of what these reasons were and how these fit into the wider patterns of 
the agent’s behaviour.
It is straightforward to see how this allows anti- causalists to respond to David-
son’s Challenge in its epistemic key. One finds out what the agent’s reason was by 
looking at what she said or did at the time, at what she said or did earlier or later, 
particularly when asked for reasons, and at what reasons previously weighed 
with her in comparable circumstances, and assesses these things against the back-
ground of what one knows to be in or out of character for this person.
As for how anti- causalism fares with Davidson’s Challenge in its metaphysi-
cal key, the question is whether the difference between a reason there is for A to 
φ and the reason A φ- s can only be understood in terms of there being a causal 
connection between reason and action. The challenge is that of saying what the 
difference consists in rather than that of telling the difference— to spell out what 
makes true a claim of the form “A acted for this reason and not for that one.” 
The point of the challenge, from the causalist’s perspective, is that if we are to 
distinguish metaphysically between the reason for which one does something 
Rameau’s Nephew is, for example (Williams 2002: Chapter 8)— the larger patterns of the agent’s be-
haviour would cease to cohere sufficiently for there to be a fact of the matter as to what the agent’s 
reason was. But the same is true on Davidson’s view: “if we are intelligibly to attribute attitudes 
and beliefs, or usefully to describe motions as behaviour, then we are committed to finding, in the 
pattern of behaviour, belief and desire, a large degree of rationality and consistency” (2001e: 237).
11. A conclusion endorsed also by Schroeder (2001).
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and a reason to do something, which in practice we are perfectly able to do, there 
must be a difference between the two; and this difference can, according to the 
causalist, lie only in the idea that one is causally efficacious while the other is not.
Yet on a Wittgensteinian understanding of what we are at when we give 
reasons, this is a conclusion the anti- causalist can resist. To give the reason for 
which one acted is to indicate a deliberative route, but not in the sense of speci-
fying the process by which, causally, one in fact got to the action in virtue of the 
reason’s causal efficacy; rather, it shows how, rationally, one gets to the action 
in virtue of the rational connections the consideration cited bears to other con-
siderations. It is only if reasons were mental states that both rationally and caus-
ally accounted for an action that giving one’s reasons for a past action would be 
equivalent to describing past psychological events or states of the agent. But as 
Wittgenstein insists, it is only in “some cases” that giving a reason means “tell-
ing the way which one has gone oneself” (1958: 14); crucially, it can also mean 
“describing a way which leads there and is in accordance with certain accepted 
rules” (1958: 14), but which one has not gone oneself. In these latter cases, giv-
ing reasons does not consist in reporting or recapitulating some psychological 
process of reasoning one has gone through. There are cases in which we act 
without consciously reflecting on our reasons, but where we can nevertheless 
be said to act for reasons. Hence, what distinguishes the reason for which one 
acts from other reasons need not be its position in a network of causes. It might 
instead be its salient position in the pattern of the agent’s reasons as a whole. 
The agent’s reason stands out as the reason for the action not in the mechanical 
sense in which it causally accounts for what is done, but in the normative sense 
in which in her view, it trumps other reasons, and thereby rationally accounts 
for the action as what, on her judgment and all things considered, is to be done. 
The relativisation to the agent’s perspective is required if agents are not to be 
conceived of as unrealistically rational. If what reasons have weight from the 
agent’s perspective is determined by what the agent, in practice, implicitly treats 
as a reason and by what reasons she would give if asked (rather than by what 
reasons became explicit as occurrent thoughts in the agent’s practical delibera-
tion), this relativisation does not conflict with Wittgenstein’s claim that the agent 
need not have her reasons in mind in order to act on them.12
The conclusion one reaches is that Wittgenstein gives anti- causalists the 
means to answer Davidson’s Challenge in both its epistemic and its metaphysi-
cal key. No appeal to causation is required either to determine that someone 
acted for one reason and not another, or to spell out what makes it the case that 
this is so.
What this Wittgensteinian response to Davidson’s Challenge brings out is that 
12. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this.
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the two camps confronting each other in the causalism/anti- causalism debate are 
opposed in both temperament and method. Where the causalist’s guiding intu-
ition is to explain action by zooming in on the agent and the mechanisms underly-
ing her movements, the anti- causalist’s intuition is to zoom out to bring the larger 
patterns of behaviour into view. Where the causalist seeks to uncover the action’s 
triggers by analysing it into particular events, the anti- causalist seeks to explain it 
by striving for a synthetic understanding of the amalgam of human interaction.13 
With a nod to Wittgenstein, Davidson in fact concedes that when we explain an 
action by reference to reasons, we redescribe the action and place it in a pattern. 
Yet he insists that there is no conflict between the two strategies. He points out 
that “events are often redescribed in terms of their causes” (Davidson 2001a: 10). 
If someone was injured, for example, we could “redescribe this event ‘in terms 
of a cause’ by saying he was burned” (Davidson 2001a: 10). In other words, a 
description which elucidates the meaning of an action can do so by reference to 
the causes of the action. Davidson’s success in reinstating causalism may well 
derive in part from his conciliatory assent to most of what anti- causalists have to 
say about the interpretive function of intentional explanation. In what looks like a 
synthesis, he takes anti- causalist insights on board while insisting that they form 
no obstacle to intentional explanations’ being causal explanations.
A possible line of objection to this Wittgensteinian response to Davidson’s 
Challenge is indicated by William Child:
The fact that we can effect a distinction by using a set of criteria which 
are not explicitly causal is clearly compatible with the distinction’s being 
a distinction between things with a causal history of one sort and those 
with a causal history of another. For example, I can tell the difference 
between the song of a garden warbler and the song of a blackcap by ap-
plying a test which is not explicitly causal; how sustained is the song, and 
what is its pitch? But the distinction thus effected is a distinction between 
songs with different aetiologies; the one is produced by garden warblers, 
the other by blackcaps. (1994: 96– 97)
Child adds that it is open to the causalist to insist that the considerations used 
to draw the distinction are in fact causal, so that the argument begs the question 
against the causal view in any case (1994: 97). This may well be the case, but the 
causalist begs the question in just the same measure by arguing merely that our 
13. The Wittgenstein- inspired expressivist approach to value is described by Simon Black-
burn along these lines: “To understand the value of a piece of money it is no good staring at it. It 
is necessary to understand the processes of human economic behaviour. You need to approach the 
token not with a microscope and a scalpel, but with an eye for large patterns of human interac-
tions” (1998: 50).
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effecting the distinction without causal criteria is compatible with the distinction’s 
being one between things with different aetiologies. Child’s argument might es-
tablish that different aetiologies are possible despite the fact that we draw the dis-
tinction without resorting to them, but what the causalist needs to demonstrate 
is that drawing the distinction requires the aetiologies to be different. As long as 
both causalist and anti- causalist interpretations are compatible with the data, 
but not entailed by it, Davidson’s Challenge fails to decide the issue.
It would in any case be imprudent to pin too much of one’s faith in causal-
ism on the possibility of differentiating between a reason to φ and the reason 
one φ- ed in causal terms. A decade after the publication of “Actions, Reasons, 
and Causes,” Davidson himself admitted that the causalist account led him to 
“despair of spelling out . . . the way in which attitudes must cause actions if they 
are to rationalize the action” (2001c: 79). The problem, originally pointed out by 
Anthony Kenny (1975), and which Davidson deemed “insurmountable,” lies in 
the possibility of “wayward causal chains,” which invalidate the conclusion that 
“if attitudes that would rationalize x cause an agent to do x, then he does x inten-
tionally” (Davidson 2001c: 79). In other words, the causalist cannot distinguish 
between the following two cases:
(3) A has a reason to φ and φ- s for that reason.
(4) A has a reason to φ and φ- s because of that reason.
(3) is the well- behaved case, in which the attitudes that rationalise φ- ing cause 
the agent to φ, and the agent φ- s intentionally, that is, for that reason. But the 
causalist account is powerless to distinguish such right causal chains from wrong 
causal chains as typified by (4). In these wayward cases, the combination of be-
liefs and desires (what Davidson calls a “primary reason”) both rationalises and 
causes the action, and yet the action is not done intentionally, that is, it is done 
only because of that reason, but not for that reason. Davidson provides the fol-
lowing example:
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding 
another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on 
the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and 
want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it 
might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it 
intentionally. (2001c: 79)
The conclusion many, including Davidson himself, have drawn from this is that 
there is no way of spelling out the “right way” in which reasons must cause ac-
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tions if the agent is to act for that reason without presupposing the notion of acting 
for reasons.14 The promise of a causalist “account of the ‘mysterious connection’ 
between reason and action” (Davidson 2001a: 11) so far remains unfulfilled.
Moreover, as Wittgenstein also remarks, there may be two reasons which 
could, with equal justification, be said to be the ones on which the agent acted, 
and “both explanations may be correct” (1966: 23). Wittgenstein gives the exam-
ple of someone whose action could be rationalised either by a conscious reason 
or by an unconscious one, even if the two explanations came into conflict with 
one another: “The explanations could in a sense be contradictory and yet both 
be correct . . . . One could be love and one could be hatred” (1966: 23). In view of 
these reminders of the way we normally go on, and which philosophy tends to 
dispose us to forget, the insistence that there needs to be a single, causally effica-
cious reason appears as a theoretical artefact, generated perhaps by the pressure 
on the causalist account to identify the salient cause of the action. When we see 
our actions in a way uncorrupted by the theoretical oversimplifications of phi-
losophy, Wittgenstein contends, there is no issue with the fact that there may be 
language games which function by deploying two utterly different but equally 
operative motives (1966: 23).15
The upshot is perhaps best summed up by saying that Davidson’s Challenge 
is effective primarily as a way to preach to the converted, but that it fails to tie the 
intelligibility of intentional explanation to the causal efficacy of the reasons for 
which we act, because Wittgenstein provides anti- causalists with the means to 
resist the challenge, and causalists themselves struggle to spell out how reasons 
must cause actions if the agent is to act for that reason without presupposing the 
notion of acting for reasons.
3. A Rapprochement between Davidson and Wittgenstein
While Wittgenstein’s writings contain the seeds of arguments to resist David-
son’s Challenge itself, one should not lose sight of the fact that they do little to an-
swer what might be called the Master Argument for causalism which provides the 
background rationale for Davidson’s advocacy of causalism about intentional 
explanation. The linchpin for this argument is that intentional explanations are 
14. See Davidson (2001e: 232– 233) and Child (1994: 98).
15. As Wittgenstein writes in Culture and Value, the only way “for us to avoid prejudice or 
vacuity in our claims” is to take any single model in terms of which we seek to understand a 
phenomenon “as an object of comparison— a measuring rod as it were— within our way of look-
ing at things,” and “not as a preconception to which everything must conform” (1998: 30). To do 
otherwise is to fall victim to “the dogmatism into which philosophy can so easily degenerate” 
(Wittgenstein 1998: 30).
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still explanations of why something happened— as opposed to explanations of why 
something counts as something else or has a particular property, such as why 
parking in such- and- such a way is illegal (Child 1994: 91).16 The Master Argu-
ment for a causalist conception of intentional explanation then runs as follows:
An intentional explanation is an explanation of why something hap-
pened.
No non- causal explanation can explain why something happened.
Therefore, intentional explanations must be causal explanations.
In order to resist the conclusion, anti- causalists about intentional explanation 
might deny either of the premises. If they choose to deny the first premise, the 
burden falls on them to show what the explanatory import of intentional ex-
planations is: intentional explanations may help us grasp the meaning or the 
significance of an action, but how can intentional explanations really explain why 
A φ- d if they fail to explain why the action occurred? If anti- causalists deny the 
Master Argument’s second premise, they can reverse the argument and reject it 
as follows: intentional explanations are not causal; they do explain why some-
thing happened; therefore, some explanations of why something happened are 
not causal. But in response, causalists can insist that for any supposedly non- 
causal explanation of why something happened, however informative, we can 
still ask why the particular event in question occurred when and how it did, and 
if the event has a cause, the answer will, if only indirectly, have to provide infor-
mation about its causal history, and will therefore be a causal explanation.17 If 
anti- causalists want to deny that intentional explanations are causal, therefore, it 
seems that they must deny that intentional explanations are explanations of why 
something happened.
If anti- causalism about intentional explanation comes at the cost of deny-
ing this prima facie plausible assumption, it is worth asking whether there is a 
textual basis to the conclusion that Wittgenstein himself goes down this path, 
or whether he is best seen as taking a rather more noncommittal position which 
leaves room for a conciliatory view of intentional explanation. Wittgenstein is 
clearly rightly claimed as an authority by anti- causalists about reasons, who 
16. Which is not to say that everybody agrees that intentional explanations are explanations 
of why something happened. Dissenters include Hornsby (2004) and Sandis (2011).
17. See Lewis (1986) and Child (1994: 91– 93) for further defence of the view that all explana-
tions of events are causal explanations. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for comments 
on this.
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maintain that reasons are not a species of causes.18 But this leaves open the ques-
tion whether he is also rightly claimed as an authority by anti- causalists about 
intentional explanation. As Alvarez (2007: 105) notes, one can deny that reasons 
are causes, in the strict sense of figuring themselves as relata in causal relations, 
while endorsing the weaker claim that intentional explanations are a species of 
causal explanation.
There can be little doubt that Wittgenstein’s work brings out a profound dif-
ference between intentional explanations and the causal explanations of phys-
ics. He emphasises that to regard bodily movements not under their mechanical 
aspect, but under their aspect as reason- guided actions, involves viewing them 
in the context of rule- governed practices and institutions (Waismann 1965: 124; 
Wittgenstein 2009: §§197– 199). This emerges from the combination of the fol-
lowing two ideas: on the one hand, as we have seen, Wittgenstein contends that 
the reasons that explain and determine the meaning of an action are given, and 
therefore constrained, by the way in which the action fits into the larger pattern 
of the agent’s character and history: they must cohere with the context of the ac-
tion, with the agent’s personality and with her past and subsequent behaviour 
(on pain of either being unintelligible or of casting doubt on her sincerity or self- 
knowledge). On the other hand, he takes the norms of reasoning which delineate 
what rational connections a reason stands in to be context- bound: they depend 
on the language game, that is, on the interactive and rule- guided complex of ac-
tivities and language- use within which something is adduced as a reason: “Not 
until there is a language game are there reasons” (Wittgenstein 1980: §689), and a 
“reason is a reason only inside the game” (Wittgenstein 1979: 4). Taken together, 
these two ideas imply that if what action a movement constitutes depends on 
the reasons that explain it, and if what reasons can explain it in turn depends on 
our practices and institutions, then the characterisation of movements as actions 
will be as context- bound as the characterisation of propositions as reasons. If we 
want to say, as Stoutland notably does, that “what constitutes an agent’s bodily 
movements as intentional under a description is their being explained by the 
agent’s reasons for acting under that description” (2010: 56),19 then the horizon of 
possible actions will in part be set by the horizon of possible reasons for action, which 
is in turn set by the context of human customs and institutions:
An intention is embedded in a setting, in human customs and institu-
tions. If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not in-
tend to play a game of chess. (Wittgenstein 2009: §337)
18. Queloz (2016; 2017), Schroeder (2001), Hacker (2009), and Glock (2014).
19. See also Hurley (1989: 97– 98).
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The institution of chess is required in order to get from the mere movement to 
the move within the game. Likewise, making a mark on a piece of paper can be 
described physically or physiologically, but whether making a mark on a piece 
of paper is writing one’s name, and whether writing one’s name is signing a let-
ter, a cheque, a contract, or a will, depends on the social customs and institutions 
it is embedded in. Absent these customs and institutions, nothing would count 
as performing these actions, no matter what went on in the mind or brain of the agent 
(Hacker 2011: 69). Thus, a key characteristic of intentional explanations which 
is alien to the causal explanations of physics is that it refers to rule- governed 
practices and institutions, and thus to the agents’ local perspectives and idiosyn-
crasies. By contrast, the hard sciences’ causal explanations of the behaviour of 
nature are not context- bound in this way. They strive for a representation of the 
world “which is to the largest possible extent independent of the local perspec-
tives or idiosyncrasies of enquirers” (Williams 2006: 184).
Yet even granted this difference, it does not follow that intentional explana-
tions are not a kind of causal explanation. Whether they are or not depends large-
ly on how wide a notion of causal explanation one has in mind; and this brings 
into view the possibility of holding on to the anti- causalist insights suggesting 
that intentional explanations are sui generis while broadening and shoring up 
one’s conception of causal explanation to make room for a sui generis mode of 
causal explanation. In the remainder of this paper, I sketch out in barest outline 
how such a rapprochement between Wittgensteinian anti- causalism and David-
sonian causalism can be achieved.
Following Strawson (1992b) and Davidson (2001b), we can distinguish be-
tween (i) the network of events or circumstances standing in extensional, natural 
relations of cause and effect, and (ii) the network of descriptions standing in 
intensional, non- natural relations of explanans and explanandum. While causal 
relations are extensional and hold between events independently of how they 
are described, relations of explanation (causal or otherwise) hold between events 
as described, which means that an event described in one way may provide an 
explanation for another, while the same event described in another way fails to 
do so. It may be that a certain event e1 caused a certain event e2, but it is the fact 
that e1 occurred which explains the fact that e2 occurred.20 Consider the following 
example:
(5) Turing died because he bit into an apple.
(6) Turing died because he ingested cyanide.
20. Strawson (1992a: 112– 113); Alvarez (2010: 29– 30); Davidson (2001b: 151).
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While (5) and (6) refer to the same two causally related events, only (6) causally 
explains Turing’s death, while (5) does not. The explanatory force of causal ex-
planation depends on the right description of explanans and explanandum. More-
over, the explanatory power of causal explanations derives from and depends 
on the obtaining of causal relations between events: it is because the opening of 
the fridge door caused the ice to melt that the fact that the fridge door was opened 
explains the fact that the ice melted and thus forms the reason why it happened. 
Behind every causal explanation there are two causally related events.
But this still allows us to distinguish between a narrow and a wide conception 
of causal explanation, and using this distinction, we can resolve the stalemate 
between anti- causalists who are impressed by the thought that reasons cannot 
be causes and causalists who are equally impressed by the thought that inten-
tional explanations must be causal explanations.
On the narrow conception, an explanation is a causal explanation just in case 
it explains why something happened and the fact acting as explanans either direct-
ly names or points to the event that stands in a causal relation to the explanandum. 
For example, if the fact that the temperature dropped explains the fact that the ice 
melted, the two causally related events— the drop and the melting— are explicitly 
mentioned. In other cases, the explanation might mention a preceding step in the 
causal chain, such as the fridge door’s being opened (which points to the drop in 
temperature by reference to its cause). But as long as the notion of causal expla-
nation involves the requirement that it more or less directly— we can think of the 
distinction as graded rather than sharp— name the causal relata at issue, denying 
that the reasons for which we act can themselves figure as such relata will bar one 
from thinking of intentional explanations as causal explanations.
On the wide conception, by contrast, an explanation will still count as a 
causal explanation if it explains why something happened and the fact acting 
as explanans only mentions features of the situation which are relevant by being 
associated with the cause. This wider conception of causal explanation thus cov-
ers what Child calls “feature- citing explanations” (1994: 103). For example, the 
fact that the driver was drunk explains the crash, and does so even if one has no 
knowledge of the proximate cause of the crash. Similarly, mentioning a property 
of something can figure in a causal explanation without our having to think of 
the property itself as a cause:
Suppose I strike this glass a smart blow, and it breaks. We can explain its 
breaking by saying that it was fragile. The cause of the glass’s breaking 
was its being struck. “It broke because it was fragile” is a causal expla-
nation, whose truth depends on the obtaining of a causal relation— the 
causal relation between the striking and the breaking. (Child 1994: 125)
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In this example, the explanans does not explicitly mention an event, but a prop-
erty of the glass— its fragility. The item which is causally related to the action and 
the item which causally explains it fall apart. Yet one still explains why something 
happened— why the glass broke— by making it intelligible why its being struck 
caused its breaking.
It seems to me, therefore, that one must refrain from concluding, as some 
have done (Hacker 2011: 69), that Wittgenstein denies that intentional explana-
tions are a species of causal explanations. If one allows for the fact that the item 
which is causally related to the action and the item which causally explains it can 
fall apart, then intentional explanations can still be a form of causal explanation. 
Intentional explanations may be sui generis, as Wittgenstein intimated; but one 
way in which they can be sui generis is by being a sui generis mode of causal ex-
planation. Nothing Wittgenstein says bars intentional explanations from being a 
species of causal explanations.
On this wider conception of causal explanation, the possibility of a rapproche-
ment between Wittgenstein and Davidson emerges, achievable by combining 
the view that reasons are not causes with the view that intentional explanations 
are causal explanations. We can maintain, with Wittgenstein, that the reasons 
for which we act are not causes, because they are the contents of our proposi-
tional attitudes— what we believe or what we desire (Glock 2014; Queloz 2017); 
but if feature- citing explanations can be causal explanations without our having 
to think of the features themselves as causes, then so can explanations in terms 
of propositional attitudes, and we can therefore also maintain, with Davidson, 
that intentional explanations are causal explanations. Facts about propositional 
attitudes— not about their content, but about the attitudes of believing or desiring 
themselves, such as that A believes that p or that A desires that q— can figure in 
causal explanations of actions on the assumption that they are associated with 
events standing in causal relations to the action to be explained.
On this conciliatory view, intentional explanations still count as a form of 
causal explanation because facts about propositional attitudes have causal im-
port. Mentioning features or properties of persons, such as the fact that Taylor be-
lieves that the steeple would please Wittgenstein and desires that he be pleased, 
would still causally explain the fact that Taylor pointed to it by rendering it intel-
ligible why his noticing the steeple caused him to stretch out his arm.
In mentioning propositional attitudes as parts of a causal explanation, we 
need not take ourselves to be “limning the units that a future neuroscience will 
use in identifying the causes of behaviour” (Robinson 1990: 51). As Davidson 
writes, “it is changes in the attitudes, which are events, which are the often un-
mentioned causes” (1993: 288). But he adds that beliefs and desires should not be 
thought of as “little entities lodged in the brain,” and therefore,
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since beliefs and desires aren’t entities, it is a metaphor to speak of their 
changing, and hence an extension of that metaphor to speak of them as 
causes and effects. What happens is that the descriptions of the agent 
change over time. The relevant entity that changes is the person, and 
there seems no difficulty in supposing that these changes have a physical 
description. (Davidson 1999: 654)
We can still acknowledge the profound differences between intentional explana-
tions on the one hand and causal explanations of the kind advanced in neuro-
physiology on the other. Indeed, it would be surprising if there were no such 
differences, since they reflect the fact that intentional explanations are tailored 
to our needs in everyday social interaction, and that they pick out the features 
of persons and their behaviour which are of most interest to us in these contexts. 
In another context, such as a neurophysiological investigation, other features are 
of interest, and it makes sense that we should advance causal explanations of 
an entirely different kind there. In each case, we turn our inquiries around “on 
the pivot of our real need” (Wittgenstein 2009: §108). But acknowledging these 
differences in kinds of explanations and the needs they answer to falls short of 
denying that intentional explanations are explanations of why something hap-
pened. There seems to be room, therefore, to bring together Davidsonian cau-
salism about intentional explanation and Wittgensteinian anti- causalism about 
reasons in a way that does justice to insights on both sides.
4. Conclusion
I have been arguing for three claims in this paper. First, Wittgenstein furnishes 
anti- causalists with the means required to answer Davidson’s Challenge and 
to resist the idea that the intelligibility of intentional explanation depends on 
reasons being causes. Second, while Wittgenstein offers us reasons to think that 
intentional explanations are sui generis, these reasons fall short of entailing that 
intentional explanations cannot be a species of causal explanation. And third, 
in response to the Master Argument to the effect that intentional explanations 
must be causal explanations of some kind, we can resolve the stalemate between 
Wittgensteinian anti- causalists and Davidsonian causalists by distinguishing be-
tween a narrow and a wide conception of causal explanation.
On the wide conception of causal explanation, a rapprochement between 
Wittgenstein and Davidson can be achieved by maintaining that the reasons for 
which we act are not causes, but that intentional explanations are causal expla-
nations in virtue of citing features of persons associated with events standing in 
causal relations to actions. This, to be sure, is no more than a sketch, and a far 
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more detailed treatment of Wittgenstein’s and Davidson’s positions than I have 
room for here would be required to flesh out the precise extent to which they are 
compatible. What even a cursory treatment of these two figureheads of causal-
ism and anti- causalism reveals, however, is that they yield much less of a basis 
for disagreement than historical dialectics suggest— indeed, that causalism and 
anti- causalism are profitably seen as complementing rather than contradicting 
one another.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the editors of Ergo and to three anonymous referees for helpful com-
ments on this paper. Thanks also to Hans- Johann Glock, Joachim Schulte, Da-
mian Cueni, and Adrian Häfliger. This paper was written with the support of 
grant P0BSP1_162025 of the Swiss National Science Foundation.
References
Aguilar, Jesús, H. and Andrei A. Buckareff (Eds.) (2010). Causing Human Actions: New 
Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mit-
press/9780262014564.001.0001
Alvarez, Maria (2007). The Causalist/Anti- Causalist Debate in the Theory of Action: 
What It Is and Why It Matters. In Anton Leist (Ed.), Action in Context (103– 123). De 
Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110898798.103
Alvarez, Maria (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford Uni-
versity Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550005.001.0001
Bishop, John (1989). Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge 
University Press.
Blackburn, Simon (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Candlish, Stewart and Nic Damnjanovic (2013). Reasons, Actions, and the Will: The Fall 
and Rise of Causalism. In Michael Beaney (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History 
of Analytic Philosophy (689– 708). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/ox-
fordhb/9780199238842.013.0023
Child, William (1994). Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. Clarendon Press, Oxford 
University Press.
D’Oro, Giuseppina and Constantine Sandis (Eds.) (2013). Reasons and Causes: Causalism 
and Anti- Causalism in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
Davidson, Donald (1993). Replies. In Ralf Stoecker (Ed.), Reflecting Davidson: Donald Da-
vidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers. De Gruyter.
Davidson, Donald (1999). Replies. In Lewis E. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Da-
vidson. Open Court.
Davidson, Donald (2001a). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. In Essays on Actions and Events 
(3– 20). Clarendon Press.
 Davidsonian Causalism and Wittgensteinian Anti-Causalism • 171
Ergo • vol. 5, no. 6 • 2018
Davidson, Donald (2001b). Causal Relations. In Essays on Actions and Events (149– 162). 
Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246270.003.0007
Davidson, Donald (2001c). Freedom to Act. In Essays on Actions and Events (73– 82). Clar-
endon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246270.003.0004
Davidson, Donald (2001d). Mental Events. In Essays on Actions and Events (205– 224). 
Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246270.003.0011
Davidson, Donald (2001e). Psychology as Philosophy. In Essays on Actions and Events 
(229– 244). Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246270.003.0012
Davidson, Donald (2004). Problems of Rationality. Clarendon Press. https://doi.
org/10.1093/0198237545.001.0001
Davidson, Donald (2005). Truth, Language, and History. Clarendon Press. https://doi.
org/10.1093/019823757X.001.0001
Glock, Hans- Johann (2014). Reasons for Action: Wittgensteinian and Davidsonian Per-
spectives in Historical, Meta- Philosophical and Philosophical Context. Nordic Witt-
genstein Review, 3(1), 7– 46.
Hacker, Peter Michael Stephan (2009). Agential Reasons and the Explanation of Human 
Behaviour. In Constantine Sandis (Ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action (75– 
93). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230582972_6
Hacker, Peter Michael Stephan (2011). Wittgenstein and the Autonomy of Humanistic 
Understanding. In Richard Allen and Malcolm Turvey (Eds.), Wittgenstein, Theory 
and the Arts (39– 74). Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Hornsby, Jennifer (2004). Agency and Actions. In John Hyman and Helen Steward (Eds.), 
Agency and Action (1– 24). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511550843.002
Hurley, Susan Lynn (1989). Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford University 
Press.
Kenny, Anthony John Patrick (1975). Will, Freedom, and Power. Blackwell.
Lewis, David (1986). Causal Explanation. In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2 (214– 240). Oxford 
University Press.
Mele, Alfred (1992). Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Mele, Alfred (2003). Motivation and Agency. Oxford University Press. https://doi.
org/10.1093/019515617X.001.0001
Queloz, Matthieu (2016). Wittgenstein on the Chain of Reasons. Wittgenstein- Studien, 
7(1), 105– 130. https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2016-0108
Queloz, Matthieu (2017). Two Orders of Things: Wittgenstein on Reasons and Causes. 
Philosophy, 92(3), 369– 397. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819117000055
Robinson, William (1990). States and Beliefs. Mind, 99(393), 33– 51. https://doi.org/10.1093/
mind/XCIX.393.33
Sandis, Constantine (2011). The Things We Do and Why We Do Them. Palgrave Macmillan.
Sandis, Constantine (Ed.) (2009). New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Mac-
millan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230582972
Schroeder, Severin (2001). Are Reasons Causes? A Wittgensteinian Response to David-
son. In Severin Schroeder (Ed.), Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 
(150– 170). Palgrave.
Sehon, Scott (2016). Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non- Causal, Compatibilist Account. 
Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495.001.0001
172 • Matthieu Queloz
Ergo • vol. 5, no. 6 • 2018
Stoutland, Frederick (1976). The Causation of Behaviour. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 28(1– 
3), 286– 325.
Stoutland, Frederick (2010). Reasons and Causes. In Pasquale Frascolla, Diego Marconi, 
and Alberto Voltolini (Eds.), Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy (46– 66). 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Strawson, Peter Frederick (1992a). Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Philosophy. 
Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198751182.001.0001
Strawson, Peter Frederick (1992b). Causation and Explanation. In Analysis and Meta-
physics: An Introduction to Philosophy (109– 132). Oxford University Press. https://doi.
org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198751182.003.0009
Tripodi, Paolo (2015). Davidson and the Wittgensteinians on Reasons and Causes. In 
Danièle Moyal- Sharrock, Volker Munz, and Annalisa Coliva (Eds.), Mind, Language 
& Action: 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium (137– 156). De Gruyter. https://
doi.org/10.1515/9783110378795.137
Waismann, Friedrich (1965). The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy. Macmillan.
Williams, Bernard (2002). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Williams, Bernard (2006). Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline. In Adrian William 
Moore (Ed.), Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline (180– 199). Princeton University 
Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958). The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the Philo-
sophical Investigations. Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1966). Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Reli-
gious Beliefs: Compiled from Notes Taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor. 
Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1979). Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1932- 35. (from the Notes of 
Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald). Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1980). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (Vol. 2). Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1982). Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (Vol. 1). Black-
well.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998). Culture and Value (2nd ed.). Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2009). Philosophical Investigations. Wiley- Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, and Friedrich Waismann (2003). The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vi-
enna Circle. Routledge.
